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URN Short Uranium / Nuclear

Uranium: The Fuel Works. The Equity Has to Wait

The physics is the bull case. A uranium pellet is dense, a reactor is baseload, and the stack emits no carbon. The short is the equity that has to sit through a 10-to-20-year mine, a contracting book that is still below replacement, and a political system that has already turned a fleet off.

Executive summary

We are short the uranium equity complex. The atom is the bull case. In 2024, Kazakhstan, Canada, and Namibia produced about three-quarters of the world’s mined uranium. The World Nuclear Association’s fuel-cycle working group has lengthened the expected time from discovery to a new mine, from 8 to 15 years to 10 to 20 years. Even under that report’s reference scenario, primary supply does not meet demand in the near term, and secondary supply is bridging the gap. That is a commodity story. It is an equity story only after someone pays for the decade in between.12

The listed names we could verify are not a pile of broken balance sheets. NexGen’s convertible debentures have a principal of US$360 million, a 9% coupon, and a carrying value of C$586.2 million, and the whole carrying amount is current. Cash and short-term investments were C$1.12 billion after a 2025 equity raise. Energy Fuels has US$700 million of 0.75% convertible notes due 2031, US$65 million of cash, and US$797 million of marketable securities. Centrus has US$1.17 billion of long-term debt and US$1.96 billion of cash. Cameco has about C$1.0 billion of debt and C$1.2 billion of cash and short-term investments, and it produced 21.0 million pounds in 2025. The debt that exists is large next to operating cash flow at the developers and at Centrus. It is covered, for now, by cash that shareholders already provided.13141516

The political point is real and it is easy to overstate. Germany shut Isar 2, Emsland, and Neckarwestheim 2 on April 15, 2023. Chernobyl killed workers with acute radiation syndrome. Fukushima, on the World Health Organization’s account, did not produce acute radiation deaths among workers or the public. Policy in 2024 and 2025 has been running the other way: the ADVANCE Act, a declaration to triple nuclear capacity, and a long-term uranium price that Cameco says peaked at a 14-year high. That momentum is the main risk to this short.5781012

How we rank the short. Likelihood and impact are Froth City’s judgment. The facts under them are from the sources in the notes.
# Reason Likelihood Impact Timing
1 New supply takes 10 to 20 years, so developers spend equity before they sell uranium High High for developers and pre-revenue reactor stocks Now, through the 2030s
2 Contracting is real, lumpy, and still below replacement High High for any equity priced on a smooth renaissance This cycle
3 A political reversal can reprice the sector. Germany already did it. It is a fat tail, not the base case Medium Severe if it happens Event-driven
4 Mine supply and enrichment are concentrated, and a shock cuts both ways High that concentration persists. Medium that a shock hurts the equity rather than the commodity High, and not reliably negative for a producer short Structural, any year
2024 mine share, top 3
75%
Discovery to mine
10-20 yrs
2025 lb contracted
116M
EIA 2025 spot delivery
$75.83
NXE convert principal
US$360M

Contents

  1. 1 The equity pays for a mine that is still years out
  2. 2 Contracting is real, and it is still lumpy
  3. 3 Politics can turn a fleet off
  4. 4 Concentrated supply cuts both ways
  5. 5 Suggested short candidates
  6. 6 Risks to the short
  7. 7 Other considerations

01 The equity pays for a mine that is still years out

This is the equity-specific short, and it is first because it is already happening. A reactor that runs for sixty years buys fuel years ahead. A new mine does not arrive on that schedule. At the World Nuclear Symposium in September 2025, Malcolm Critchley, co-chair of the working group behind the World Nuclear Association’s fuel report, said the expected development timeline had been changed from 8 to 15 years to between 10 and 20 years, and that the time is getting longer. The IAEA’s own phase chart puts exploration alone at 10 to 15 years and feasibility at 1 to 3 years, before construction. Top producing mines, on the same WNA report, are expected to be depleted in the 2030s. Identified resources are not the constraint. The wait is.23

Stated uranium mine development ranges, in years Prior range, 8 to 15 years 15 2025 report, 10 to 20 years 20
Figure 1. The bars are the upper end of the range the WNA fuel-report working group stated, not a measured average of mines. Source: World Nuclear News, September 5, 2025, quoting Malcolm Critchley.

The cash statements of the developers match that calendar. NexGen, a pre-production company, used C$47.5 million of cash in operations in 2025 and spent another C$185.1 million on exploration and evaluation. It covered the year with C$903.7 million of net proceeds from a global equity offering. Energy Fuels used US$89.5 million of cash in operations. Oklo used US$82.2 million and reported a US$139.3 million operating loss, with no material interest-bearing debt in the 10-K sections we reviewed. Nano Nuclear’s quarter ended December 31, 2025 used US$4.0 million of operating cash, and the same filing says the year ended September 30, 2025 used US$19.6 million. None of those figures is a mine in production. All of them are shareholders funding a timeline.13141718

Higher rates make that wait more expensive, and the mechanism is dilution more often than a missed coupon. The names with convertibles still have cash. The cost shows up as shares. NexGen’s debentures are already classified as current. Energy Fuels sold a US$700 million convertible so it would not have to sell as many shares in 2025, and the conversion price is about US$20.34. Likelihood is high because the lead time is the industry’s own number and the cash use is already in the filings. Impact is high for anything that does not pour yellowcake yet. Timing is this decade.

02 Contracting is real, and it is still lumpy

Cameco’s 2025 MD&A is the cleanest account of the cycle, and it does not say the renaissance has already filled the order book. In 2025, utilities placed about 116 million pounds under long-term contracts. Cameco says that volume remained below replacement rate. The long-term price strengthened through the year and peaked in December at US$86.50 per pound, which Cameco calls a 14-year high. The spot price was volatile and averaged US$73.54. UxC, as Cameco cites it, counts about 589 million pounds contracted in the long-term market over five years against about 815 million pounds consumed. The gap is the uncovered requirement. It is also the reason a developer can spend for years and still miss the book, because utilities sign with the producers who can deliver.5

The US delivery series says the same thing in a different unit. EIA’s weighted-average price of uranium purchased by US reactor owners under spot contracts, not inflation-adjusted, was $29.62 per pound in 2016, $28.70 in 2020, $40.70 in 2022, $71.92 in 2024, and $75.83 in 2025. Long-term contracts delivered to those reactors were cheaper than spot deliveries in the last two years: $50.36 in 2024 and $55.91 in 2025. EIA’s spot contract is a one-time delivery, usually within a year of signing. It is not the daily TradeTech or UxC indicator, which is why it sits a couple of dollars away from Cameco’s US$73.54 average. Both series rose. The term book did not swallow the spot print.4

EIA weighted-average spot-contract price of uranium delivered to US reactors, dollars per pound 2016 $29.62 2020 $28.70 2022 $40.70 2024 $71.92 2025 $75.83
Figure 2. Dollars per pound U3O8 equivalent, weighted-average price on spot-contract deliveries to US reactors. Not inflation-adjusted, and not a daily spot indicator. Bars are scaled to $80. Source: EIA Table S1b.

Cameco itself shows what execution looks like when the contracts exist. It produced 21.0 million pounds in 2025, its share, above a revised guide of up to 20 million. It delivered 33.0 million pounds and finished with 9.7 million pounds of inventory. It also says several idled mines restarted in 2025 and that delays and higher costs were a common theme. The hype gap is not “nothing got built.” The gap is between a sector multiple that discounts 2040 and a term market that, in the producer’s own MD&A, is still writing contracts below the rate reactors burn fuel. Likelihood is high. Impact is high for equities that need the next contract, not the last one. Timing is this cycle.516

03 Politics can turn a fleet off

Germany is the case, and it is recent. On April 15, 2023, the last three German nuclear plants, Isar 2, Emsland, and Neckarwestheim 2, were shut down. The phaseout had been restarted by the Bundestag in 2011 after Fukushima. A war in Ukraine reopened the argument, and the plants still closed. One legislature can do that. A short that needs every country to copy Germany is a different, weaker short. We rank a broad phaseout as medium likelihood because the current policy flow, documented in the risks section, runs toward more reactors. We rank the impact as severe because the precedent is a G7 fleet going to zero.7

The health record does not do the work the draft wanted it to do. UNSCEAR’s account of Chernobyl: 134 emergency workers were diagnosed with acute radiation syndrome, and 28 of them died in the first three months. About 115,000 people were evacuated in 1986, and about 220,000 more were relocated in later years. The WHO Chernobyl Forum, in 2005, said fewer than 50 deaths had been directly attributed to radiation by then, and that a projection of up to about 4,000 eventual radiation-related cancer deaths applied to the higher-exposed groups. That 4,000 is a projection. It is not a counted body toll.89

Fukushima is a different accident. The WHO says there were no acute radiation injuries or deaths among workers or the public from radiation released in the accident. The World Nuclear Association, summarizing UNSCEAR’s 2013 and 2020 reports, says no radiation-related deaths or acute radiation diseases were observed among workers and the public, and that future radiation-associated health effects among residents are unlikely to be discernible. More than 160 workers received doses above 100 millisieverts. The political fact that survives is the evacuation and the dread, which were enough to move German law. A Fukushima radiation death toll put next to Chernobyl’s acute deaths is not what these sources say.1011

Local opposition and multi-year licensing fights are the slow version of the same point. They stretch the 10-to-20-year mine clock. They are not a second catastrophe thesis, so they sit with the other considerations. Likelihood of another Germany-scale shutdown somewhere is the medium we assigned. Impact is severe. Timing is whenever the next accident, or the next election, makes a fleet a campaign.

04 Concentrated supply cuts both ways

In 2024 the world mined 60,213 tonnes of uranium. Kazakhstan produced 23,270 tonnes, 38.6 percent. Canada produced 14,309 tonnes, 23.8 percent. Namibia produced 7,333 tonnes, 12.2 percent. Those three are 74.6 percent. The World Nuclear Association rounds the shares to 39, 24, and 12 percent and says about three-quarters of mine production comes from those countries. WNA also says more than half of mine production comes from state-owned mining companies. Uzbekistan, on WNA’s estimate, was 4,000 tonnes. Russia’s mines were 2,738 tonnes, 4.5 percent of the world, which is not the same thing as Russia’s role in enrichment.1

Share of 2024 world uranium mine production Kazakhstan, 38.6%, 23,270 tU Canada, 23.8%, 14,309 tU Namibia, 12.2%, 7,333 tU All others, 25.4%, 15,301 tU
Figure 3. 2024 mine production, tonnes of uranium. The three named countries are 74.6 percent of 60,213 tonnes. WNA rounds them to 39, 24, and 12 percent. Some countries are WNA estimates. Source: World Nuclear Association, updated January 20, 2026.

Enrichment is a separate map, and the number we will use is the one EIA counts. In 2025, US reactors purchased 12,710 thousand separative work units of enrichment services. Russia was the origin of 3,284 thousand, which is 26 percent of the total and 34 percent of the 9,780 thousand that came from foreign origin. We are not using an unsourced claim that Russia holds about 40 percent of world enrichment capacity. The US purchase share is enough to show that a sanction, an export ban, or a transport break can move the fuel cycle. The US ban on Russian uranium imports, which the Department of Energy described in 2024 as already enacted, is itself a policy that tightens Western supply. That supports the uranium price. It is a risk to a short on producers, and it is written up as one.612

Niger is the production fact, not a story we will invent. WNA’s table shows Niger at 4,116 tonnes in 2015 and 962 tonnes in 2024. Cameco’s market commentary refers to a mine suspension in Niger in 2024. We do not have, in the sources used here, a primary account of expropriation that we are willing to put in the note. A supply shock from a concentrated map raises the commodity. It can also freeze a project, a shipment, or a utility’s willingness to sign. Likelihood that the map stays concentrated is high. Likelihood that the next shock is bad for the equity, rather than good for the pound, is only medium. That is why this reason is fourth.15

05 Suggested short candidates

The screen was funded debt, or a debt-like convertible, set against cash and against operating cash flow, from the latest filing we could read. A name is here only if those figures were in a filing that was already public. We did not include URA, URNM, NLR, the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust, Uranium Energy, enCore, Denison, or NuScale. ETF assets, trust NAV, and those four balance sheets were not in a form we were willing to quote. Borrow, locate, and rebate were not checked. Pre-revenue names and Canadian listings can be hard to borrow and expensive to hold. A convertible can be amended, converted, or refinanced.

Table 1. Debt, cash, and operating cash flow from the latest filing cited. Dollars in millions. Parentheses are cash used. Liquid assets are cash plus short-term investments or marketable securities where the filing separates them.
Name As of Funded debt Cash and liquid investments Operating cash flow
NexGen (NXE) Dec 31, 2025 US$360 principal. Carrying value C$586.2, all current C$802.6 cash and C$321.1 short-term investments C$(47.5), plus C$185.1 of exploration spend
Energy Fuels (UUUU) Dec 31, 2025 US$700.0 principal, 0.75% notes due 2031 US$64.74 cash and US$797.11 marketable securities US$(89.5)
Centrus (LEU) Dec 31, 2025 US$1,174.8 long-term. No current debt US$1,957.2 cash US$51.0
Cameco (CCJ) Dec 31, 2025 C$1.0 billion total debt C$1.2 billion cash and short-term investments Adjusted EBITDA about C$1.9 billion
Oklo (OKLO) Dec 31, 2025 None found in the 10-K sections reviewed US$788.4 cash. US$1,412.5 including marketable debt securities US$(82.2)
Nano Nuclear (NNE) Dec 31, 2025 No funded-debt line. Total liabilities US$6.48 US$577.5 cash US$(4.0) in the quarter. US$(19.6) in the year ended Sept 30, 2025
Funded debt and liquid assets for US-dollar filers, in millions LEU debt $1,175 LEU cash $1,957 UUUU notes $700 UUUU liquid $862 OKLO debt None found OKLO liquid $1,413 NNE debt No debt line NNE cash $578
Figure 4. US dollars in millions at December 31, 2025. Red is funded debt. Navy is cash plus, for Energy Fuels and Oklo, marketable securities. Bars are scaled to $2,000 million. NexGen and Cameco are Canadian-dollar filers and are in Table 1, not on this axis. Energy Fuels debt is principal, not carrying value.

NexGen is the cleanest debt-like short in the set. The debentures have an aggregate principal of US$360 million and a fixed coupon of 9 percent. Carrying value at December 31, 2025 was C$586.2 million, and the maturity table puts that entire amount in the current column. Current liabilities were C$630.4 million. Cash was C$802.6 million and short-term investments were C$321.1 million, so liquid assets cover the carrying amount. Interest paid was C$29.7 million. The company is explicit that it has no revenue, a net loss of C$309.7 million, and an accumulated deficit of C$691.2 million, and that the October 2025 equity financing, about C$948.6 million gross, is why working capital covers current obligations for at least fifteen months. The short is a pre-production asset funded by a current convertible and a bought deal. It is not a prediction that NexGen misses a payment this quarter. Borrow in the US listing can differ from the Canadian line.13

Energy Fuels has the largest cheap convertible against the thinnest cash line. On October 3, 2025 it closed US$700.0 million of 0.75 percent convertible senior notes due November 1, 2031. The conversion price is about US$20.34, a 32.5 percent premium to the September 30, 2025 close, and capped calls lift the effective price to US$30.70. Cash was only US$64.74 million. Marketable securities were US$797.11 million. Working capital was US$927.44 million, and that figure also counts receivables and about 810,000 pounds of finished uranium. Operating cash use was US$89.48 million, worse than US$43.97 million the year before. Net of cash and securities the notes are covered, and 2031 is not a wall. The short is the coupon-light dilution and a business that still burns operating cash while the equity carries a uranium and rare-earth growth story. We did not pull the notes’ carrying value, so the US$700 million in the chart is principal. The stock is not a pure uranium short.14

Centrus is a lot of debt next to a small operating-cash number, and a larger pile of cash. The 2025 Form 10-K shows cash of US$1,957.2 million, long-term debt of US$1,174.8 million, and no current debt. Short-term inventory loans were US$38.9 million and are not in that debt line. Cash provided by operating activities was US$51.0 million. Net income was US$77.8 million. Cash from financing was US$1,224.9 million. Debt is about twenty-three times operating cash flow, and cash covers the debt with about US$782 million left over. This is a fuel-cycle company that raised, not a miner that cannot pay. The short is the equity valuation on a build the balance sheet already funded. The government franchise and the inventory book are reasons a borrow can be special, and reasons the short can be wrong.15

Cameco is the liquid way to be short the sector, and leverage is not the reason. The 2025 MD&A reports C$1.2 billion of cash and short-term investments and C$1.0 billion of total debt. Figures the company means as US dollars in that discussion are written US$, including the US$200 million term loan it repaid. Adjusted EBITDA was about C$1.9 billion. Production, its share, was 21.0 million pounds. The short is the multiple on a contracting cycle Cameco itself describes as still below replacement, in a producer that is delivering. If the term price stays at the December high and the uncovered requirements get signed with Cameco, this is the name that collects. The US government partnership around Westinghouse, which Cameco describes as an expected aggregate investment value of at least US$80 billion, sits in the risks, not in the debt table.16

Oklo and Nano Nuclear are net-cash valuation shorts. Oklo’s 10-K says cash, cash equivalents, and marketable debt securities were US$1,412.5 million at year-end. Those securities are assets. Cash and equivalents were US$788.4 million. Net cash used in operations was US$82.2 million, the operating loss was US$139.3 million, and the net loss was US$105.7 million. We did not find a material funded-debt balance. Nano Nuclear’s December 31, 2025 balance sheet shows US$577.5 million of cash and US$6.48 million of total liabilities, with no funded-debt line. Operating cash use was US$4.0 million in the quarter and, as that filing states it, US$19.6 million in the year ended September 30, 2025, when the net loss was US$40.1 million. Both companies say existing cash funds the plan they describe for at least the next year. The short is the price of a pre-revenue reactor story, not a coupon. A high cash balance is also what makes a short painful if the company does nothing but wait.1718

06 Risks to the short

Policy momentum is the first risk, and it is not a footnote. On July 10, 2024 the Department of Energy wrote that the ADVANCE Act had been signed, inside the Fire Grants and Safety Act, and described it as a bill to speed licensing of new reactors and fuels. The department said the Act directs the NRC to reduce certain licensing fees and authorizes more review staff, and that DOE prize competitions can cover NRC fees for first movers, subject to appropriations. The same article says the United States has committed to tripling nuclear capacity, and it treats Congress’s ban on Russian uranium imports as already in place. A ban tightens the market the short is hoping will disappoint.12

The industry’s own demand case is the second risk. The WNA fuel report, with data cut off at the end of June 2025, counted 398 GWe from 439 operable units and 69 units under construction totaling 71 GWe. Its reference scenario, built from government and utility targets, goes to 449 GWe by 2030 and 746 GWe by 2040, including 49 GWe of small modular reactors. China and India are more than half of the projected new reactors in that telling. Cameco says the declaration to triple nuclear capacity by 2050 had been signed by 33 countries, and that its long-term price peaked at US$86.50. If utilities close the replacement gap with the producers who can deliver, reason 2 fades and Cameco is the wrong short.25

Cameco’s Westinghouse partnership with the US government is a specific version of the same risk. The company says the collaboration provides for the government to arrange financing and facilitate permits for new Westinghouse reactors with an aggregate investment value of at least US$80 billion. That figure is Cameco’s description of the program, not a cash balance. It is large enough to reprice the integrated fuel-cycle story if the reactors are actually ordered. Artificial-intelligence load is the demand narrative underneath several of these policies. We do not have a utility offtake in this note that we are willing to size. The direction of policy is enough to say the short is fighting a bid.16

The short is wrong if the 10-to-20-year clock shortens, if the next hundred million pounds of term contracts land with the listed developers rather than with Cameco and Kazatomprom, and if no legislature repeats Germany. It is also wrong, more quietly, if the net-cash stories simply do not run out of money before the multiple holds. Cash of US$1.4 billion at Oklo and US$578 million at Nano Nuclear is a long clock.

07 Other considerations

Local opposition is the slow form of reason 3. A community fight or a licensing queue adds years to a project that is already measured in a decade. It is not a separate pillar. We do not have a counted set of blocked Western mines that we are willing to put beside the Germany shutdown.

State miners change the competitive set. WNA says more than half of mine production comes from state-owned companies, some of which will produce for security of supply rather than for the margin a listed junior needs. That is a headwind for a developer trying to win a utility contract. It is also a reason the pound can stay available even when a Toronto or New York equity is diluting.1

What we corrected in the draft. The title idea, “the amazing clean energy that nobody wants,” overstates the politics. Governments, the WNA reference case, and Cameco’s contracting commentary all describe buyers. Fukushima is not a Chernobyl-scale radiation death toll. Chernobyl’s acute deaths are the 28 workers among 134 with acute radiation syndrome, and the 4,000 figure is a 2005 projection for the most exposed groups. Germany’s phaseout is a fact. A claim that one accident anywhere will trigger a crackdown is a fat tail, and current US and multilateral policy is a risk to the short, not a detail. The “10 to 15 year” lead time is now the industry group’s old range. The 2025 report uses 10 to 20. Niger’s production fell from 4,116 tonnes to 962 tonnes on WNA’s table, and Cameco refers to a 2024 suspension. We do not assert a coup or an expropriation. We do not assert that Russia is 40 percent of world enrichment capacity. The verified enrichment figure is 26 percent of US reactor purchases in 2025. Most of the suggested shorts are net cash once marketable securities are counted. The heavy-debt screen mostly finds convertibles that equity already funded.

Names left out. URA, URNM, and NLR are baskets. A basket short is a reasonable expression of this note, and we left them out because we did not quote a current factsheet for assets or for holdings weights. The Sprott Physical Uranium Trust was left out for the same reason: no NAV or holdings figure from a current filing is in this note. Uranium Energy, enCore, Denison, and NuScale were left out because a debt, cash, and cash-flow set we could stand behind was not in hand. A later note can add them. This one will not invent the numbers.

08 Notes

  1. World Nuclear Association, “World Uranium Mining Production,” updated January 20, 2026, as archived on September 6, 2026. The 2024 country table, the 60,213 tonne world total, the 39/24/12 rounding, the “about three-quarters” sentence, and the statement that more than half of mine production comes from state-owned companies are from that version. WNA says the figures can be revised and that some countries are estimates. Archived page.
  2. World Nuclear News, “Investment decisions needed to avoid fuel cycle supply gaps,” September 5, 2025, on the World Nuclear Association fuel report launched that day. Operable capacity of 398 GWe from 439 units, 69 units under construction, the reference scenario of 449 GWe by 2030 and 746 GWe by 2040, and Malcolm Critchley’s 10-to-20-year development timeline are from that account. world-nuclear-news.org.
  3. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium: From Exploration to Remediation,” IAEA Bulletin 59-2. The phase graphic gives exploration as 10 to 15 years and feasibility as 1 to 3 years. iaea.org.
  4. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Table S1b, weighted-average price of uranium purchased by owners and operators of US civilian nuclear power reactors, 2003–2025, dollars per pound U3O8 equivalent, not inflation-adjusted. Spot-contract and long-term-contract columns. EIA defines a spot contract as a one-time delivery, usually within one year of signing. eia.gov.
  5. Cameco Corporation, management’s discussion and analysis for the year ended December 31, 2025, Exhibit 99.3 to the Form 40-F filed March 19, 2026. The 116 million pounds placed under long-term contracts in 2025, the below-replacement comment, the US$73.54 average spot price, the US$86.50 December long-term peak, the UxC five-year contracting comparison, the Niger 2024 mine suspension, and the 33-country tripling declaration are from that exhibit. The UxC figures are Cameco’s citation of UxC, not a separate filing. sec.gov.
  6. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Table 16, purchases of enrichment services by owners and operators of US civilian nuclear power reactors, thousand SWU, 2021–2025. Russia, foreign total, United States, and total for 2025. eia.gov.
  7. Germany, Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BASE), “The nuclear phase-out in Germany.” Shutdown of Isar 2, Emsland, and Neckarwestheim 2 on April 15, 2023, and the 2011 Bundestag decision. base.bund.de.
  8. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Chernobyl pages. The 134 workers with acute radiation syndrome, the 28 deaths in the first three months, the 1986 evacuation of about 115,000 people, and the later relocation of about 220,000 people. unscear.org.
  9. World Health Organization, “Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident,” September 5, 2005, on the Chernobyl Forum. Fewer than 50 deaths directly attributed by mid-2005, and the projection of up to about 4,000 eventual radiation-related deaths among the higher-exposed populations. who.int.
  10. World Health Organization, “Health consequences of Fukushima nuclear accident.” No acute radiation injuries or deaths among workers or the public from radiation from the accident. who.int.
  11. World Nuclear Association, “Fukushima Daiichi Accident,” summarizing UNSCEAR 2013 and the 2020 report. No radiation-related deaths or acute diseases observed among workers and the public, and the statement on future effects among residents. world-nuclear.org.
  12. US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “Newly Signed Bill Will Boost Nuclear Reactor Deployment in the United States,” July 10, 2024. The ADVANCE Act, the description of NRC fees and staffing, the prize competitions, the tripling commitment, and the reference to Congress’s ban on Russian uranium imports. energy.gov.
  13. NexGen Energy Ltd., audited consolidated financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, in thousands of Canadian dollars, filed as Exhibit 99.3. Cash, short-term investments, convertible debentures, operating cash use, exploration spend, interest paid, equity proceeds, and the US$360 million principal at 9 percent. sec.gov.
  14. Energy Fuels Inc., Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025. The US$700.0 million 0.75 percent notes due November 1, 2031, the conversion price and capped calls, working capital, cash, marketable securities, and net cash used in operating activities. Dollars in that filing are US dollars unless noted. sec.gov.
  15. Centrus Energy Corp., Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025. Cash, long-term debt, current debt, short-term inventory loans, and cash provided by operating activities, in millions of US dollars. sec.gov.
  16. Cameco Corporation, management’s discussion and analysis for the year ended December 31, 2025, Exhibit 99.3 to the Form 40-F filed March 19, 2026. Cash and short-term investments, total debt, the repaid US$200 million term loan, adjusted EBITDA, production of 21.0 million pounds, deliveries, inventory, and the US government partnership described as at least US$80 billion of aggregate investment value. Amounts written as US$ in that discussion are US dollars. The cash and total-debt lines are not marked US$, and Cameco’s consolidated reporting currency is the Canadian dollar. sec.gov.
  17. Oklo Inc., Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025. Cash, cash equivalents, and marketable debt securities of US$1,412.5 million, cash and equivalents of US$788.4 million, operating cash use of US$82.2 million, operating loss of US$139.3 million, and net loss of US$105.7 million. Marketable debt securities in that sentence are assets. sec.gov.
  18. Nano Nuclear Energy Inc., Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2025. Cash, total liabilities, quarterly operating cash use, and the company’s statement of operating cash use and net loss for the year ended September 30, 2025. sec.gov.

This note is opinion, not investment advice. Froth City Research and its affiliates may hold positions in securities discussed. Do your own diligence.